Barney Oliver, long in the tooth, was set to retire in late 1980 as HP's only CTO or VP of R&D. While he had shepherded HP's successful entry into "Personal Computing" via first the HP 9100A Desktop Calculator (an incredible marvel for its day, one that computer historians eschew as being a 'PC' for purist reasons) and then via the stunning scientific calculators (HP 35, followed by a whole string of 'firsts'), Barney was agnostic at best about HP entering the mainframe / minicomputer business. True, he did garner a number of new patents for his novel switching power supply designs for HP's 2000 family, but that had little to do with computing per se.
And truth of the matter be known, HP not only was a laggard in computing circles with old architectures, outdated machines, and a plethora of 'families' which did not interconnect (e.g. compilers for one would not work with another, nor were peripheral drivers consistent, etc.). It was more and more a quagmire.
John Young had recently become the first non-founder CEO, chosen over his fiery colleague Paul Ely by David Packard as 'the responsible one.' Ely had flogged the computer divisions much as HP leaders had always done, to be the best at their 'little fiefdom' whether it be CPUs, disc drives, or recorders. This translated into NIH and general unwillingness to work with other divisions to assure that individual produdcts would work together. The result was much duplication of relatively simple projects in order to have coverage for the disparate 'computer systems' that HP produced (e.g. HP 1000, HP 2000, HP 3000 and HP 9000 families), which were all independently derived and supported lines, each needing a full panoply of support hardware, software, peripherals, and ancillary equipments. It was maddening for customers, and incredibly expensive for the development teams with very little advantage from unique contribution.
What to do about it?
The signal was a big one, not just a red flag but a RED FLAG OMEN. Stanford University sponsored an architectural summit around this new idea from IBM, called Reduced Instruction Set Computing. And, in a more than irksome fashion, HP was not invited to send anyone to the summit. Hewlett and Packard at the time were the largest benefactors to Stanford in its entire history; John Young was a Trustee, and John Doyle was intimately connected to the school. Moreover, HP had helped initiate, underwrite, and had become the flagship user of the Stanford Honors Co-operative program for working engineers to advance their education while working. (Note: I was already one of the beneficiaries of this program, earning an MSEE from Stanford while working full-time at HP).
Young and team, chastened by this affront, met to discuss "What next?" and their conclusion was that they needed a strong computer systems leader to step into Barney's shoes, at least for the compute side.
Who?
This was a plum job for leading headhunters, and Joel Birnbaum, IBM's Computer Science leader, was the chief target, especially since his lead researcher, John Cocke, had led the first RISC design. When approached, however, Birnbaum was diffident at best. His observation--HP in computing was about one-twenty-fifth the size of IBM, and came in at about number fourteen in annual compute revenues. Why would he bother with a job at such an also-ran?
Fifteen years at IBM had not created a great fortune for Birnbaum, but measured in terms of 'the team' it was a plush job. For his Computer History Museum interview years later, he recalled some of his IBM teammates fondly, including 16 IBM Fellows and a Nobel Laureate. The list he quickly recited as colleagues also included 11 Turing Award winners and 6 Eckert-Mauchly award winners from the prestigious ACM computer society.
HP had (and still has) no historic Turing winners, Stanford has nine. HP did have two Eckert-Mauchly winners in recent years (Norm Jouppi and Josh Fisher, both earning their awards before their HP time).
After several entreaties, though, Birnbaum accepted an invitation to visit (he told an interviewer that he decided he could get a free trip for him and his wife to the Bay Area so that she could attend an opera in San Francisco). As unforeseen events sometimes unfold, the net result was that HP was able to persuade him to join, as the replacement for Oliver's computer research leader. This story, lengthy in its detail, is contained in The HP Phenomenon, pp. 265-273 (https://www.sup.org/books/business/hp-phenomenon)
A fascinating vignette in that book is when Birnbaum told two IBM colleagues that he was going to visit HP, and John Cocke said: "He's' going to give you the Barney Oliver interview." Birnbaum asked, "what is that?" and Cocke replied, "Get ready to take another PhD exam." Birnbaum said to Cocke: "Bullshit. He's not going to give me any PhD exam."
Birnbaum went on in the CHM interview to say that he walked in to meet a scowling Oliver, arms folded, who commanded in a Jehovah-like booming voice, "Sit down." Oliver then, according to Birnbaum, "went through all the pleasantries that he could handle, which was maybe eleven seconds."
When I heard this description from Birnbaum, it instantly took me back to my own first interview with Barney almost twenty years prior--and his contempt for my lack of full understanding of the three small "C's" of calculus--conformal mapping, convolution integrals, and celestial mechanics (tools that were in extremely modest usage around HP laboratories).
Well, net net--Birnbaum offered that RISC designs could unify the disparate HP computer offerings, and HP leadership leaped on the idea, and forthwith, he came. To run the HP Computer Research program.
But HP had more activity than computers underway. It was a $2.5 billion annual revenue company, with just $1 billion in computing. Most of the revenue, and most of the engineers in fact, were involved with scientific instrumentation -- for engineers of all stripes (aeronautical, mechanical, electronic, software), and scientists (chemists, biologists, astronomers, physicists, mathematicians, and environmental science).
Rather than saddle Birnbaum with all this, HP put John Doyle in place as the overall VP of R&D, with Joel reporting to him. And then, in an unexpected move, Doyle and Young concluded that the basic R&D health of HP, especially the creativity side, had been ebbing with the constant emphasis on low-hanging fruit for short-term revenue improvement rather than longer-term breakthrough products (welcome to the Harvard Business Review management style--e.g. the last decade or two demise of HPE, Cisco, Boeing, and today's unfolding tragic story of Intel).
My great advantage was that I was ready for a change, and I'd had some surprising success with two kinds of HP projects--first, stand-alone products: the large-screen displays that had irked Packard for a time, and then the highly successful leadership line of logic state analyzers that truly dented the old Tektronix armor; and secondly, "integrated systems" evidenced by the Microcomputer Development Systems (HP 64000 family), which decimated Intel's early leadership with chip developers. This latter program required integrating technology from 14 HP divisions to make a coherent system, something the computer divisions had singularly proven unable to do. See the HP Journal, 32 pages, October 1980. https://hparchive.com/Journals/HPJ-1980-10.pdf
So, Young and Doyle invited me to create HP's Corporate Engineering department to emphasize both increased innovation and increased productivity via co-ordinated development. Tall order, and I won't here claim wild success, but it had the great advantage of letting me have the "D" side of Barney's job, while Birnbaum got the "R" side mostly (and Doyle picked up some "R" for instruments as well).
Thus, when someone sends a note about "Who was Birnbaum?" it causes me to reflect and just be thankful that I was privileged to get to know this incredible man more than most.
I'll add more about Joel and what he did for HP and for the world in a subsequent post.